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The Manner and Form Theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty:  A Nelson’s Eye View of the 
UK Constitution?   1
Stuart Lakin, University of Reading S.J.Lakin@Reading.ac.uk 
Abstract- This review article examines Michael Gordon's manner and form understanding 
of the UK constitution.   It begins by assessing his proposed 'positivist and political' method 
of constitutional analysis.  This method, I argue, unfairly loads the dice in favour of his 
theory of parliamentary sovereignty. I recommend instead the anti-positivist, interpretative 
method as a neutral way of assessing the manner and form theory against rival theories. As 
an interpretation of the constitution, I argue that Gordon's account of absolute unlimited 
legislative authority, underpinned by the ideals of majoritarian democracy and political 
constitutionalism, is unconvincing.  To begin with, its emphasis on reform of legislative 
procedures makes a peripheral, occasional, feature of the UK constitution central.   More 
problematically, it gives an implausible model of legal and judicial practice in the UK.  
Keywords: Parliamentary sovereignty, democracy, political constitutionalism, ethical 
positivism, common law constitutionalism, interpretivism 
 A review of Michael Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics 1
and Democracy (Hart Publishing 2015).   
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1. Introduction 
In Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy 
(hereafter Sovereignty), Michael Gordon defends a manner and form theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty. According to this theory, Parliament possesses legally unlimited 
legislative authority: it can pass laws with any content it chooses, and it can change its 
legislative procedures in any way it chooses. Seasoned constitutional lawyers will be 
familiar with the Dicey-Jennings-Wade-Heuston debate about whether a sovereign 
Parliament has the legal power to change its own procedures.   According to the Diceyan 2
orthodoxy, it does not (the ‘old’ view), since this would amount to one parliament binding 
its successors;  according to Jennings and others, it does, since this reflects the true scope of 3
legislative authority (the ‘new’ view).  In his conclusions, Gordon sides with Jennings over 4
Dicey, but he laments the ‘arid’ character of that earlier exchange.   Where Dicey and 5
Jennings were, he says, concerned only with the logical entailments of legislative 
sovereignty, Gordon sets out to advance a normative justification for the manner and form 
  For a helpful overview, see AW Bradley, 'The Sovereignty of Parliament - Form or Substance?' in 2
Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution, 7th edn (OUP  2011).
  See AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th edn (Macmillan 3
1915).   WI Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 1st edn (University of London Press 1933).  
 Gordon himself rejects the 'old' versus 'new' view framework for debate.  See Sovereignty (n 1)  4
287.
 ibid 15.5
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theory.  His arguments are rooted in democratic theory and political constitutionalism, hence 
the references in the sub-title of his book to process, politics and democracy.  
 Sovereignty is an important and impressive contribution to UK constitutional 
scholarship. Gordon's defence of the manner and form theory is imaginative, erudite and, I 
sense, driven by deeply held democratic convictions. Whether or not he persuades readers 
that this theory gives the best account of the contemporary UK constitution, he offers a host 
of valuable insights about the potential for radical reform of legislative procedures, and even 
of parliament itself, in the name of democracy.    Without wishing to detract from these 6
points, this review article will raise two critical questions about his book.   
 First, I shall ask whether its method is sound. A recurring theme through the chapters 
is the need to separate descriptive arguments about the content of the law and constitution, 
from normative arguments about whether that content is morally acceptable. According to 
Gordon, legal interpretivists mistakenly conflate legal and moral argument such that the law 
and constitution is whatever a given interpreter finds to be morally attractive. I shall argue 
that this view misrepresents or misunderstands the interpretative method. His own 'positivist 
and political' method, on the other hand, is question-begging and rather convoluted. 
Arguments about the content of the law and the constitution, I shall argue, can neither be 
wholly empirical as he maintains, nor wholly moral - the view he incorrectly attributes to 
interpretivists. Such arguments must instead involve a subtle interaction between empirical 
and moral facts. If this is correct, then the task of defending a manner and form reading of 
the UK constitution will be far more arduous than Gordon's own constitutional method 
would suggest. 
 Sovereignty (n 1), especially ch 8.6
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 My second question is how well Gordon's manner and form theory fares as an 
interpretation of UK constitutional practice compared to the theories he criticizes. I shall 
argue that his majoritarian democratic-political constitutionalist defence of parliamentary 
sovereignty gives a distorted and partial account of contemporary UK constitutional 
practice. In its emphasis on parliament’s power to change its own procedures, it accentuates 
a part of the constitution that has little day to day significance; conversely, in its very thin 
account of the role of judges and adjudication, and its dismissal of common law rights and 
the (substantive) rule of law, it underplays parts of the constitution that dominate the 
modern constitutional landscape.  
 This review begins, in part 2, with a summary of the argument of Sovereignty.  Parts 
3 and 4 address the two criticisms outlined above.   
2.  The Argument of Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics 
and Democracy 
Gordon's overarching aim in Sovereignty, he says, is to show that the manner and form 
theory of parliamentary sovereignty (hereafter 'the manner and form theory') gives the best 
account of contemporary constitutional practice in the UK.  More particularly, he wants to 
show that the manner and form theory gives a better account of the contemporary 
constitution than one based on Dicey’s doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, or one based 
on common law constitutionalism (CLC). What are his yardsticks for determining whether 
one theory of the constitution is the correct one, or better than others?  First, he looks to the 
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weight of empirical evidence in its favour. Following Dicey, he thinks that descriptive 
analysis of ‘whether limits to parliamentary sovereignty have emerged is a potent means to 
challenge the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty’.    Secondly, he looks to the normative 7
appeal of the theory. As he puts it, ‘any descriptive claim about parliamentary sovereignty 
must also be informed by an understanding of the normative scheme underpinning the 
doctrine.’      8
 In the first chapter of Sovereignty, Gordon develops this combination of normative 
and descriptive analysis into what he calls the ‘positivist and political perspective’ on the 
constitution.  His perspective is positivist in that it adopts the version of positivism known 9
(among other names) as ‘ethical’ positivism.  This version of positivism claims that there 10
are good reasons for separating what law is from what law ought to be.  He pointedly 
prefers this version of positivism to so-called ‘descriptive’ positivism, on the basis that a 
constitutional theorist must - as he sees it - think about more than the narrow question of 
which criteria of legal validity exist.   11
Gordon is drawn to ethical positivism on both a retail and wholesale level.  On the 
retail level, he thinks that people should be able to identify particular legal rules without 
having to make controversial moral judgements.  At the same time, he wants to avoid 
‘granting priority to the beliefs of the judiciary, who will be called upon to resolve 
 Sovereignty (n 1) 16.7
 ibid 17.8
 ibid 19.  9
 In particular, he follows Jeremy Waldron’s understanding of that theory. See Jeremy Waldron, 10
'Normative (or Ethical) Positivism' in Jules Coleman (ed), Hart's Postscript: Essays on the 
Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).   See, further, Tom 
Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (Ashgate 1996).
 Sovereignty (n 1) 17. 11
	  5
[disputes]’.  On the wholesale level, he argues that the separation of law and morality 12
allows us to think about the purpose of law as a social institution.   His perspective is 
political, he says, in that it works from the ‘immanent’ political principles and values within 
a specific constitutional order rather than from an ideal scheme.  By basing a theory on the 13
actual practices of a constitutional order, he says, we avoid engaging in ‘abstract and 
unrestrained moral or political reflection’;  we avoid the dangers of a method, which 14
‘views all constitutional doctrine as malleable, and, if found to be unappealing, susceptible 
to being interpreted away’;  and we provide an ‘authentic’  basis on which people can 15
understand and criticise the constitution.  As one progresses through Sovereignty, it 16
becomes clear that the unnamed constitutional method under attack here is the so-called 
'interpretative' method found in the work of Ronald Dworkin and Trevor Allan among 
others.  In part 3 (below), I shall argue that Gordon misrepresents or misunderstands that 17
method.  Far from refuting interpretivism, I shall suggest that the methodological and 
substantive claims about law and the constitution in Sovereignty only make sense as one 
contentious application of the interpretative method.     
 ibid 18.   12
 ibid 20-21. The inspiration for the 'political' part of Gordon's method is Martin Loughlin, 13
Foundations of Public Law (OUP 2010).  See further Michael Gordon, 'A Basis for Positivist and 
Political Public Law: Reconciling Loughlin's Public Law with (Normative) Legal 
Positivism' (2016)  7 Jurisprudence 449. 
 Sovereignty (n 1) 20.  14
 ibid 21.15
 ibid 21.16
 See, Ronald  Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana 1986) ch 2 and passim; TRS Allan, The 17
Sovereignty of Law: Freedom Constitution and Common Law (OUP  2013).  Gordon peppers his 
chapters with criticisms of the interpretative method.   See, for instance, Sovereignty (n 1) 17-18, 
137-38, 149-50, 286-87.
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 One of the virtues of the positivist and political perspective, Gordon tells us, is that it 
successfully reconciles positivist with anti-positivist approaches to constitutional analysis.  18
On the one hand, he thinks he can say with Dicey and descriptive positivists that the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is an empirically ascertainable fact about the 
constitution, rather than a doctrine whose existence depends on the strength of its 
justification.  This means, he readily concedes, that ‘the absence of a compelling normative 
justification could not be taken, in itself, to undermine the legal authority of this 
fundamental constitutional norm’.  On the other hand, he claims to be able to reach out to 19
anti-positivists by insisting that the factual existence of parliamentary sovereignty is not the 
whole of the story: normative positivism, he emphasises, allows deeper enquiry about 
underpinnings of public law without ‘reducing the validity of constitutional rules to a 
function of their attractiveness’.  This normative dimension to Gordon’s constitutional 20
method, he says, also serves to distinguish his defence of the manner and form theory from 
that of Sir Ivor Jennings.   Where Jennings engaged in debates of ‘logical and legal 
authority rather than principle’,   Gordon seeks to 'reinvigorate the political foundations of 21
the constitution'.   22
 In line with the positivist part of his method, Gordon stresses the need to examine the 
‘function and virtue’ of parliamentary sovereignty in tandem with, but separately from, 
empirical argument about its existence. By insulating the question of sovereignty's existence 
 Sovereignty (n 1) 17.18
 ibid 21.19
 ibid 20.  20
 ibid 62.  21
 ibid 15. 22
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from evaluative considerations, he says, we ensure that ‘we know what is at stake’ in the 
event that parliamentary sovereignty is eroded;  we resist 'casual calls' for its abandonment; 23
and we make sure that any decision to dispense with sovereignty is made transparently.  24
The function of parliamentary sovereignty, he explains, is constitutionally all-encompassing. 
It is a 'central organising principle', standing at the apex of the constitutional hierarchy of 
norms, and structuring the relationship between branches of government.  It is a 25
constitutional 'focal point' for citizens in the absence of a written constitution’,  ‘a clear 26
hub’,  a 'basic premise from which attempts to explore the operation of the 27
constitution...can begin'.         28
 The core virtue of parliamentary sovereignty, Gordon says, is that it 'ensures the 
constitutional primacy of (majoritarian) decision-making'.  Parliamentary sovereignty is 29
about 'working things out through democratic processes'.  As Waldron puts it, ‘everything 30
[must be] up for grabs in a democracy, including the rights associated with democracy 
itself’;  hence, says Gordon, there can neither be substantive nor procedural limits on 31
parliamentary power.  In circumstances of disagreement about questions of rights and 32
 ibid 3, 55.23
 ibid 30.24
 ibid 24-26.25
 ibid 26.26
 ibid 26.27
 ibid 27.28
 ibid 6.29
 ibid 47.30
 ibid 37.   See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999) 303.31
 Sovereignty (n 1) 289.32
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justice, a political community should make decisions by majority vote through its 
representatives.  It should value process rights such as the right to participate, above a 33
'results-driven' approach under which judicial enforceable rights are seen as pre-conditions 
to democratic decision-making.  The latter approach, he says, 'disregard[s] the respect 34
which is accorded to citizens as a result of their very engagement in a democratic process'.  35
 Gordon anticipates the objection that majoritarian decision-making may lead to the 
'tyranny of the majority'.  In line with Waldron, he replies, for instance, that the tyranny of 36
a minority of judges is worse in so far as it 'tyrannically exclude[s] certain people from 
participation as equals'.  Equally, he rejects as a caricature the view that Parliament is an 37
'elective dictatorship' dominated by government. In his view, the existing and developing 
mechanisms of accountability and scrutiny in parliament suffice to keep government 
check.    But even if democratic procedures prove to be imperfect, he says, majoritarian 38
democracy allows and encourages the system to improve from within.   This, in turn, avoids 
'complacency about the functioning of a political system, and a willingness to explore new 
ways in which government can be improved'.    39
 ibid 35, 289.  See Waldron (n 31) ch 1.   33
 See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Oxford, 34
Oxford University Press, 1996) ch 1. 
 Sovereignty (n 1) 38.  And see Jeremy Waldron, 'A Rights Based Critique of Constitutional 35
Rights' (1993) 13 OJLS 18, 50.
 Sovereignty (n 1) 39. 36
 ibid 40.  See Jeremy Waldron, 'The Core Case Against Judicial Review' (2006) 115 Yale Law 37
Journal 1346, 1396
 Sovereignty (n 1) 50-53.  38
 ibid 53.39
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 Majoritarian democracy is Gordon's justification for parliamentary sovereignty, but 
what is his justification for the manner and form understanding of sovereignty? The 
traditional view, put forward by Heuston, was that the theory guards against 'the dangers 
arising from an abuse of sovereignty' in so far as it allows for procedures that make it more 
difficult for Parliament to legislate.  But if limiting power were the objective, says Gordon, 40
then CLC would arguably be a better candidate.  Equally, the requirement (say) of a super-41
majority would undercut the majoritarian premise that each vote is worth the same as every 
other. In the face of these and other difficulties, Gordon rejects the abuse of power 
justification for the manner and form theory, and promises a 'fresh normative justification' 
for the theory.    He takes as his starting point the view found in the early work of Jennings, 42
that 'both the Government and the House of Commons derive their authority from the 
people'.     This meant, for Jennings, that there was no need for constitutional limits on 43
parliamentary authority.  Instead, 'the accountability of the government to Parliament and 
the electorate was of principal significance in conditioning the use of legislative power'.   44
One of the most original and creative aspects of Sovereignty is the direction in which 
Gordon takes Jennings' views.  In Chapter 7, he offers a novel way of reconciling the 
manner and form theory with majoritarian democracy, using the framework of political 
constitutionalism.  In a challenging and densely argued discussion, which can at times be 
 RFV Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law 2nd edn (London, Stevens and Sons, 1964), 6.  40
Sovereignty (n 1) 287-8.
 Sovereignty (n 1) 288.  41
 ibid 290.42
 WI Jennings, Parliament, 2nd edn (CUP 1957) 8.43
 Sovereignty (n 1) 291.  44
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difficult to follow, he argues that the political constitutionalist ideal of prioritising politics 
over law can work in combination with the principle of majoritarian democracy to justify 
the manner and form theory of parliamentary sovereignty.  When understood in the light of 45
democracy and political constitutionalism, Parliamentary sovereignty becomes the 'core 
legal principle of the political constitution'.  It represents the 'political principle that in a 46
democracy there should be no legal limits to the wishes of the people'.   '[By] clearing the 47
field of the possibility of legal limits on law-making power, [the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty] creates a space which politics can, and must, fill'.  Crucially, Gordon thinks 48
that 'clearing the field' must extend both to matters of substance and process.  Legislation 
should always have an effect if it is the result of the democratic decision-making process.  49
This is not to say that legislative power is unlimited; 'Parliament is sovereign, but not 
omnipotent': it is that the limits should only be those that arise internally from democratic 
politics rather than those than are imposed externally through law and courts.    50
 I have so far been discussing the normative part of Gordon's argument in Sovereignty 
(the 'positivist' side of the positivist and political perspective). What about the other side of 
his argument, his empirical (or 'political') defence of the manner and form theory? Gordon 
argues that three features of UK contemporary constitutional practice reveal, cumulatively, 
 ibid 299.   45
 KD Ewing, 'The Resilience of the Political Constitution' (2013) 14 German LJ 2111, 2118.46
 ibid.47
 Sovereignty (n 1) 298, 284.48
 ibid 302.49
 ibid 5.  50
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that the manner and form theory is the 'new orthodoxy' in the constitution.  First, the UK’s 51
membership of the EU.  Second, the Parliament Acts and the decision in Jackson.   Third, 52
the referendum locks of the European Union Act 2011. Alongside these positive pieces of 
evidence, he adduces negative evidence to show how various challenges to the manner and 
form theory fail. These are the 'non-critical' challenges posed by devolution legislation, the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and CLC. These challenges are non-critical because, he 
says, in the case of the devolution Acts and the HRA, the only limits on parliamentary 
sovereignty are political;  and, in the case of CLC, because the theory is an 'unsustainable 53
interpretation of the UK constitutional arrangements'.  Gordon is wary, however, of a 54
'composite' challenge based on each of these non-critical challenges.  He worries that each 55
of these challenges threatens a 'more expansive role for judges';    and he is eager to nip in 56
the bud the risk that a 'richer [CLC] narrative' might emerge from them.        57
 Gordon's analyses of the different pieces of positive and negative evidence just 
described are intelligent and provocative.  I shall consider just a small sample of his many 
detailed arguments during the course of my critiques below. His strategy is to examine each 
constitutional provision through the lens of (principally) four different theories: his own 
manner and form theory, the ‘constitutional revolution’ theory of Wade,  the ‘procedure and 58
 ibid 7.51
 R (on the application of Jackson) v Attorney General  [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262.52
 Sovereignty (n 1) 113.53
 ibid 114.54
 ibid.55
 ibid.56
 ibid. 57
 HWR Wade, 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' (1955) 13 CLJ 17258
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form’ theory of Goldsworthy,  and CLC. My aim is as much to question the nature of that 59
examination as it is to question Gordon's conclusions in favour of the manner and form 
theory.   I shall suggest that significant problems with the former cast significant doubt on 
the latter. 
3.  The Positivist and Political Perspective: Loading the Dice 
The first question I want to raise about Sovereignty concerns its method. The point of 
developing a method of constitutional analysis, we might say, is to establish a way of 
working out which account of the constitution - the content of its legal and constitutional 
rights, duties and powers -  is the correct or strongest one.  The method should allow for an 60
appraisal of rival accounts against selected criteria without favouring any given account in 
advance of the appraisal.   Put differently, the method must be substantively neutral.  Its 61
focus might be, for instance, the important features of a practice,  the 'central case' of the 62
practice,  or the principles that best justify the practice.   So, given Gordon's coverage in 63 64
Sovereignty, a suitable constitutional method will allow him to establish whether his manner 
 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (CUP 2010).59
 I do not mean to say that this is the only possible aim of constitutional and legal analysis, but I 60
take this to be Gordon's aim in Sovereignty.  See Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes, (Harvard UP 
2006) ch 8.   
 For discussion, see N W Barber, The Constitutional State (OUP 2010) ch 1.61
 See Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 62
(Clarendon Press 1994) 209. 
 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980), ch 1.63
 Dworkin (n 17).    64
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and form theory of parliamentary sovereignty gives a better account of the constitution than 
CLC or the Diceyan theories of Wade or Goldsworthy. Both parts of Gordon's positivist and 
political perspective appear, at first glance, to enable such a fair comparative appraisal to 
take place. The political part of his method holds that the correct theory of the constitution 
must be one that is reflected in the 'actual', 'authentic' practices and 'immanent' doctrines of 
the constitution.  The positivist part holds that, besides establishing the descriptive 65
accuracy of an account of the constitution, we should also seek to justify and evaluate the 
theory as a matter of political and constitutional morality. If we view Gordon's method in 
this skeletal form, then we can see how any one of the rival accounts of the constitution 
under consideration might emerge as the correct one. 
 Look more closely, however, and we see that both parts of the positivist and political 
perspective are far from neutral between competing theories.   Take the following 
description Gordon gives of UK constitutional practice - the 'political' part of this method: 
'[Parliamentary sovereignty] shapes and organises [constitutional] practice...for such practice is, to a significant extent, 
a function of the recognition by constitutional actors and institutions of the sovereignty of parliament...[W]ere 
discussion of constitutional practice to become disengaged from the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the result 
would be, in the short term, to produce an inauthentic account of the operation of the constitution.  And in the longer 
term, shorn of the terminology of parliamentary sovereignty, the ordering of, and relationships between, UK 
constitutional actors would be susceptible to changing from their present state.'  66
It is clear from this passage that Gordon has very firm ideas about what counts as 'authentic', 
'actual' UK constitutional practice. In his view, actual UK constitutional practice necessarily 
 Sovereignty (n 1) 21, 30.65
 ibid 29.66
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reflects absolute parliamentary sovereignty and all of the many functions that he ascribes to 
it.  A theorist whose account of the constitution denies these functions, or which eschews the 
terminology of parliamentary is guilty, Gordon implies, of giving an inauthentic account of 
UK constitutional practice. They risk changing the 'present state' of things.  
This same methodological bias reappears in the other part of his method, the 
normative or 'positivist' part. Gordon insists, recall, that it must be possible to identify, 
without recourse to controversial moral judgements, the extant doctrines and practices 
within the constitution.    For him, this allows critical reflection on the purpose of law; it 
allows citizens to identify their legal rights and duties; and it means that judges are not left 
to make contentious moral judgments about the content of the law.   The problem here, 67
once again, is that these values are predisposed towards his own substantive account of the 
constitution. As he frankly admits, we must accept the positivist separation of law and 
morality because that separation preserves parliamentary sovereignty: it means that 
Parliament's powers are not contingent on how judges interpret statutes.    68
 Once we expose the constitutional biases in Gordon's positivist and political 
perspective, it becomes clear that this is not a method of constitutional analysis at all - at 
least in the sense of being a substantively neutral way of determining the correct account of 
the constitution. Rather, it is a preliminary statement of the constitutional theory that he 
defends in his book, dressed-up as a method. Where a constitutional method should 
facilitate disagreement about the constitution, his method forestalls disagreement - other 
than, perhaps, on the narrow question of what parliamentary sovereignty really means. In 
 ibid 17-21.67
 ibid 149-50.68
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order to test Gordon's manner and form theory fairly against other theories of the 
constitution, we need to employ some other method. Before I offer such an alternative, it is 
worth pointing out some of the regrettable consequences that Gordon’s positivist and 
political perspective has for the structure and style of argument in Sovereignty.  These 
consequences are symptomatic of the problems I have identified above. 
 In terms of its structure, Gordon gives us a blinkered and unbalanced view of the UK 
constitution.  His interest is only in those those statutes, dicta, doctrines, political practices, 
and so on that, as he sees it, support his manner and form theory of parliamentary 
sovereignty.      For example, he gives minimal coverage to the HRA 1998, an Act that has 
spawned a rich, extensive and much-debated jurisprudence;  yet he devotes a lengthy 69
chapter to the EU Act 2011, a provision which has hardly caused a flicker of interest among 
judges since its enactment.   In part 4 below, I shall argue that Gordon's choice of positive 70
and negative evidence gives a distorted picture of UK constitutional practice. In terms of the 
tone of its arguments, Sovereignty reads as a hymn of praise to majoritarian democracy and 
political constitutionalism and a diatribe against judicial review, the rule of law and other 
associated CLC ideals. Gordon's discussions are full of impassioned language in favour of 
parliament and politics and against judges and law: 'I categorically reject [CLC]',  '[CLC is] 71
 Other major works on the UK constitution notably place the HRA 1998 at its core.  See e.g. 69
Alison Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing 2009); 
Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2009).  
 Gordon finds it 'remarkable' that section 18 of the 2011 Act was not addressed in R (HS2 Action 70
Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324.   See 
Sovereignty (n 1) 248.   The 2011 Act admittedly figured in R. (on the application of Miller) v 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 WLR 583 (SC), but 
only as an interpretative guide to the scope of the royal prerogative: see e.g. [111].  The court 
attached very little importance to section 18: see [66].
 Sovereignty (n 1) 206.71
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entirely without foundation'.  Wherever he detects a hint of support for CLC in cases, 72
statutes, doctrines or academic arguments, he dismisses them as being, for instance, 
'illusory',  'mere rhetoric',  or 'aberrations'.  Any judge or CLC theorist reading 73 74 75
Sovereignty had better have a thick skin.     
 While Gordon is entitled to have the courage of his political convictions, the 
approach to UK constitutional analysis just described makes for an extremely polarised and 
non-conciliatory style of scholarship. Rarely, if ever, does he attempt to see merit in CLC, or 
attempt to find some common ground with it.  Indeed, I shall suggest in the next section that 
he parodies this theory beyond recognition. CLC scholars, he says (echoing Goldsworthy) 
are guilty of seeking to 'sweep the field' by explaining every aspect of the constitution in 
terms of law and judicial power.  Similarly, they are guilty of 'surreptitious methodological 76
manoeuvr[ing]' by their use of an interpretative method which, as Gordon sees it, privileges 
the power of courts.  The irony in these objections seems to be lost on Gordon.  For they 77
are precisely the types of problems that can be identified in his own account of the 
constitution.   The effect of his method and substantive arguments, as seen above, is 
preemptively to rule out any account of the constitution that does not accept absolute 
parliamentary sovereignty and a minimalist account of law and adjudication. Gordon cannot 
 ibid 206.72
 ibid 132.73
 ibid 122.74
 ibid 122.75
 ibid 131.  Goldsworthy (n 59) 50.76
 Sovereignty (n 1) 149.77
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have it both ways: if he thinks a constitutional method must be neutral between different 
accounts of the constitution, then he must eliminate the biases in his own method.    78
 There is one final observation to make about Gordon's method at this stage.  It leads 
him, at times, into precisely the style of analysis that he himself condemns as 'arid' in the 
work of Dicey and Jennings.  Having declared that parliamentary sovereignty forms an 79
essential part of UK constitutional practice, he turns his attention to investigation of the 'true 
nature' of sovereignty.   In a rather dry, legalistic discussion, he explores, for instance, 80
whether sovereignty relates both to manner and form,  and whether it means that 81
parliament must have the 'capability' or 'capacity' to enact any law.  He concludes -  largely 82
in abstraction from any consideration of cases, statutes or moral theory -  that the manner 
and form theory gives the 'true understanding of this norm'.  Admittedly, Gordon later 83
claims to find empirical evidence for his preferred version of parliamentary sovereignty in 
selected cases and statutes, but he gives the impression that much of work in defence of his 
manner and form theory can be done in the philosopher's armchair. If so, then this rather 
detracts from his aim to reinvigorate the earlier manner and form debate. 
A. Replacing the Dice: The Interpretative Method 
 I take it that Gordon does support substantive neutrality by his avowed aim to demonstrate that 78
the manner and form theory 'provides us with by far the best explanation of contemporary 
constitutional practice in the UK' ibid 3. The implication here is that the practice might yield any 
number of different explanations besides one committed to parliamentary sovereignty.  
 ibid 15.79
 ibid 75-108.80
 ibid 93-108.81
 ibid.82
 ibid 283.  83
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I have argued above that Gordon's positivist and political perspective loads the dice in 
favour of his own constitutional theory. We need a method that will allow for a fair contest 
between his manner and form understanding of the UK constitution and rival 
understandings. The method I propose is the so-called 'interpretative' method. According to 
this method, the correct understanding of the constitution is the one that gives the strongest 
moral justification for the salient features of UK constitutional practice.  It may seem 
mischievous to recommend a method that Gordon himself rejects at every opportunity in 
Sovereignty. But I shall try to show that his objections to interpretivism are misdirected.   If 
we understand the interpretative method correctly, we shall see that his arguments in 
Sovereignty are best understood in this way. This is not the place to give a full exposition or 
defence of the interpretative method.   I shall instead outline the method by way of a series 84
of correctives both to Gordon's own method and to his (mis)understanding of the 
interpretative method itself.       
 Gordon tells us, recall, that UK constitutional practice contains specific 'immanent 
doctrines': principally, absolute parliamentary sovereignty and its concomitant account of 
law and adjudication. Anyone who rejects these specific doctrines, he implies, displays a 
lack of fidelity to the actual practice. That this account of the practice is the correct one, he 
says, is true for two reasons. First, because it reflects the 'true nature' of the concept of 
sovereignty; secondly, because it is supported by empirical evidence from selected statutes, 
 For a particularly clear exposition and defence of the interpretative method, see Nicos 84
Stavropoulos, ‘Legal Interpretivism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist/ (accessed 2 Jan 2018).
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cases, dicta and political practices.  Dworkin points to insuperable problems with both of 85
these types of argument. In relation to the first, it makes little sense, he says, to try to 
uncover the true meaning of a political concept like sovereignty. Unlike a liquid or animal, 
such concepts have no chemical composition or DNA that will prove one understanding to 
be correct and others incorrect.   86
Consider the main theories of legislative authority discussed in Sovereignty. Gordon 
thinks that parliament possesses absolute unlimited legislative authority; Goldsworthy 
thinks that parliament possesses unlimited authority on matters of substance, but that its 
authority is severely limited on matters of legislative procedure;  and Allan thinks that 87
parliament authority is limited both in relation to substance and procedure (to the extent that 
we can separate them).  None of these theorists will be able to persuade the others that their 88
understanding uncovers the true nature of parliamentary authority, where the other 
understandings give false understandings. Disagreements about political concepts - unlike 
disagreements about concepts of a natural kind - simply do not work in this way. 
 The second empirical strategy in Sovereignty fails for similar reasons.  Gordon points 
to selected UK statutes, cases and dicta in support of his manner and form account of the 
constitution; but Goldsworthy, Wade and Allan point to other statutes, cases and dicta - or to 
different aspects of the same statutes, cases and dicta - in support of their accounts of the 
constitution. For example, where Gordon points to the express words in statutes and 
 See Gordon's explanation of this division at Sovereignty (n 1) 5-7 and 283.85
 See Dworkin (n 60) 150-154.86
 Goldsworthy (n 59).87
 Allan (n 17). 88
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judgments, Allan points to the moral principles that best justify legal texts.   Such different 89
choices of evidence, in turn, give rise to very different understandings of particular 
institutional decisions and doctrines.    
Take the decision in Anisminic, where the House of Lords interpreted a textually 
unambiguous statutory ouster clause to allow for judicial review to correct an error of law.  90
In line with his choice of evidence, Gordon takes this decision to be an 'aberration' within 
constitutional practice.    In line with his choice, Allan takes the same case to be 91
paradigmatic of the way in which common law principles inform the meaning of statutes.  92
Take instead the more recent and momentous decisions in Thoburn and HS2.  For Gordon, 93
the constitutionalising dicta in these judgments are merely 'thematicaly influential', but 
without legal authority.   For Craig the same dicta are a powerful affirmation of CLC 94
within the constitution.   95
 Where does this take us? In the face of persistent disagreements about which which 
evidence gives the correct account of UK constitutional practice, Gordon cannot beg the 
question by insisting that his choices give the empirically correct account. As far as Allan, 
Goldsworthy and others are concerned, their account gives the correct, authentic account of 
the practice, and rival accounts are inauthentic. No matter how much evidence Gordon 
 Allan (n 17) 35.89
 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.90
 Sovereignty (n 1) 122.91
 Allan (n 17). 92
 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, [2003] QB 151; HS2 (n 70) above.93
 Sovereignty (n 1) 190 and, generally, 183-192.94
 Paul Craig, 'Constitutionalising Constitutional Law: HS2' [2014] PL 373-392.   95
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summons from different parts of the practice, other theorists will point to parts of the 
practice that counter that evidence. And they will insist that their understanding of particular 
institutional decisions is correct where other accounts are incorrect. For Dworkin, this type 
of dispute is a dead-end. Once again, it shows that empirical analysis is the wrong type of 
argument for understanding constitutional practice.  It is for this reason, I suggest, that 96
Gordon must either modify or abandon the 'political' part of his method.  He must accept 
that his manner and form theory is just one candidate understanding of UK constitutional 
practice, competing with other understandings. 
 We now come to the next step in the argument.  Given the impossibility of factually 
evaluating different accounts of the constitution, we need some non-factual way of 
achieving this aim.  Interpretivists such as Dworkin and Allan contend that the right type of 97
judgement combines descriptive and moral considerations, but is neither purely descriptive 
nor purely moral.  Every account of a legal and constitutional practice, they contend, 98
depends on, or presupposes, a contentious political theory about the nature of law, 
democracy, separation of powers and other political principles.   This political theory 99
justifies the choice of a given theorist to treat some aspects of the practice rather than others 
as legally or constitutionally significant.  Gordon's emphases on absolute parliamentary 100
sovereignty, political accountability and minimal judicial review, on this view, are not now 
 See Dworkin (n 17) ch 2.  I pursue these critiques further in Stuart Lakin, 'Debunking the Idea of 96
Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Controlling Factor of Legality in the British Constitution' (2008) 28 
OJLS 709-714.  
 See Mark Greenberg, 'How Facts Make Law' in Scott Hershovitz (ed), Exploring Law's Empire 97
(OUP 2008).
 See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Clarendon Press 1986) ch 6. Allan (n 17) passim.98
 Dworkin (n 17) ch 3.  Allan (n 17) passim.99
 See Greenberg (n 96), Stavropoulos (n 84). 100
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the question-begging assertions of factual correctness criticised above: they are the upshot 
of his majoritarian-political constitutionalist political theory. Likewise, Allan's emphases on 
limited parliamentary power, common law principles and constructive judicial review are 
the upshot of his liberal-republican political theory.  101
 If the relationship between moral argument and the practice just described were the 
end of the story, then Gordon's recurrent objections to interpretivism would be sound. He 
would be right to say, for example, that CLC scholars will 'interpret away' any part of the 
practice that does not conform to their moral theory.  And he would be right to object that 102
the question 'is parliament sovereign?' collapses into the question 'is it justified that 
parliament is sovereign?'.  But interpretivists are very careful not to end their story here. 103
It is not enough, they say, that an account of the practice is morally attractive or 
unattractive. The success or otherwise of an account of the practice must depend on whether 
the model of the practice generated by a theorist's moral theory gives a good account of the 
salient features of the practice: its institutional structures, procedures, decisions and patterns 
of reasoning.    In this sense, moral theory conditions the practice, but the practice 104
conditions moral theory.     105
 There is much more that needs to be said about the interpretative method, but I shall 
not attempt to explain or defend it any further at this point.  We shall acquire a better sense 
of it in the next section when we see it in action.  To conclude this part of the essay, I want 
 See Allan (n 17) ch 3.101
 Sovereignty (n 1) 21.102
 ibid 18.103
 Dworkin (n 17) ch 3.104
 ibid. 105
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to offer some brief reflections on how interpretative constitutional analysis improves on the 
form of analysis envisaged by Gordon's positivist and political perspective.    
 To begin with, the interpretivist method does not pre-commit us to any particular 
concrete doctrines in the way that Gordon's method does.   It leaves open the question of 
what counts as the 'authentic' UK constitutional practice. Equally, interpretivism opens the 
way for any number of moral theories to give the best understanding of the constitution; it 
does not inherently privilege a judge-centric understanding of the constitution in the way 
that Gordon claims.  And it may or may not support his majoritarian democratic-political 106
constitutionalist moral convictions. Each theorist faces the same explanatory and 
justificatory burden to vindicate their theory. Crucially, Gordon must work much harder to 
make an interpretative case for the manner and form theory than the factual case envisioned 
by his own method. 
 Secondly, the interpretative method can make for more constructive style of debate 
between rival constitutional theorists than we find in Sovereignty. Where Gordon seems 
intent on torpedoing other theories, the interpretivist method encourages a charitable and 
constructive attitude to rival theories.  The personal moral convictions of a theorist must 107
give way the moral theory reflected in the practice. No matter how much Gordon opposes 
rights, the (substantive) rule of law and judicial review; and no matter how much Allan and 
others may oppose majoritarian democracy and political constitutionalism; each theorist 
 Sovereignty (n 1) 149-50.  For a sophisticated argument as to why interpretivists should not 106
focus solely on courts, see Dimitrios Kyritsis, Shared Authority Shared Authority Courts and 
Legislatures in Legal Theory (Hart Publishing 2015) especially ch 4.
 For example, the interpretative method may conceivably support Gordon's ethical positivist 107
views on law and the constitution.  The best interpretation of a legal system might be one in which 
law is only the explicit rule or utterance in legal texts and judgments.  See Dworkin (n 17) ch 4.   
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must allow for the possibility that their disfavoured moral theories, and the institutional 
arrangements recommended by those moral theories, give the best interpretation of the 
practice.    In these respects, interpretivism bridges rival legal and political theories in a way 
that Gordon's own method - despite his ambitions for it - manifestly does not. 
   
4.  Does the Manner and Form Theory Give the Best Interpretation of UK 
Constitutional Practice? 
We are now in a position to assess Gordon's manner and form theory against other theories 
of the UK constitution, but not at all in the empirical fashion he himself envisages in 
Sovereignty.  In place of Gordon's positivist-political perspective, I shall pose the following 
interpretative question: does Gordon's majoritarian democratic-political constitutionalist 
case for unlimited legislative authority justify and fit UK constitutional practice?  This 
question leaves Gordon's detailed arguments in favour of the manner and form theory in 
Sovereignty where they were, but we shall see that it dramatically alters the conditions under 
which those arguments may provide the best understanding of the UK constitution. I shall 
address Gordon's interpretation of the constitution in two parts. First, his account of 
parliament's power to change it own procedures.  Second, his account of the role of law, 
courts and adjudication.     108
A.   Parliament's Power to Change Its Own Procedures 
 Unless I indicate otherwise, I shall use the word 'interpretation' and 'interpretative' from now on 108
to denote the morally loaded anti-positivist method of constitutional analysis defended above.
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Gordon's primary aim in Sovereignty - the mission statement of his book, we might say - is 
to show that Parliament has an 'expanded legislative power' to change its procedures in any 
way it sees fit.     How does his interpretation of this aspect of UK constitutional practice 109
fare against that of Wade and Goldsworthy? 
 Wade argued that judicial obedience to statutes depends on a common law rule.  110
This rule, he argued, is the ultimate political fact upon which the whole system of 
legislation hangs'.  Parliament could not logically have the power to establish, change or 111
abolish the very rule that recognises statutes as law.    Hence, he concluded, the manner 112
and form theory was fallacious.  The only way that the manner and form could change 113
was by 'revolution'; and even then it would be for courts to decide whether such a change 
had occurred.    It was argued in part 3 above that Gordon cannot defeat this view as a 114
matter of acontexual, conceptual analysis; he must instead show that Wade's theory neither 
fits nor justifies UK constitutional practice.   When understood in this interpretative way, 
Gordon's arguments are persuasive. As a matter of political morality, he argues that Wade's 
theory makes constitutional change almost impossible, 'entrench[ing] in the wider political 
culture a sense that fundamental constitutitonal reform need not be seriously considered, 
because it is - at least in accordance with the rules of the existing system - impossible 
 Sovereignty (n 1) 323. 109
 Wade (n 58).110
 Sovereignty (n 1) 189.111
 Ibid 188.112
 ibid 189.113
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lawfully to effect.'    In addition, Gordon rejects Wade's theory for being court-centric.  He 115
finds it paradoxical for courts to have such a central role in the event of an extra-legal 
constitutional revolution.     116
 These moral arguments against Wade's theory cannot, by themselves, defeat his 
'revolutionary' view. It is not enough that Wade's theory may unsettle Gordon's individual 
moral convictions about the primary of democratic decision-making.  As an interpreter, 117
Gordon must further show that these moral arguments do not fit UK constitutional practice. 
Here again, his argument is persuasive. Wade's view that any fundamental change to the 
constitution is revolutionary and extra-legal, Gordon argues, is is counter-intuitive and 
contrary to established constitutional practice.  The enactment of the ECA 1972, for 118
instance, was clearly within the existing legal framework rather than an extra-legal 
revolution:  'the essential domestic architecture was untouched'.  And even if one looks at 119
episodes in constitutional history that were far more plausibly revolutionary in character, it 
is clear enough that Wade's court-centric view is 'far removed from the reality of 
revolutionary change, in which multiple constitutional and political actors will be engaged 
in, and influence, a complex process of reshaping or reconstituting a community's system of 
government'.         120
 ibid 79.  115
 ibid 78-79.116
 ibid 79.117
 ibid 76-83.118
 ibid 154-5.119
 ibid 78.  Gordon gives the example here of the Glorious Revolution of 1688.120
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 What about the 'procedure and form' view of Goldsworthy?   Goldsworthy contends 
that there must be legal limits to the changes parliament can make to its own procedures. 
Only by narrowing the range of possible procedural changes, he argues, can we ensure that 
Parliament does not inadvertently limit itself in substance.  The test he lays down is as 
follows:  
'legally binding and judicially enforceable requirements as to procedure or form are consistent with parliamentary 
sovereignty, provided that they do not control or restrict the substantive content of legislation, or make it so difficult for 
Parliament to legislate that its power to do so is diminished'.  121
He reserves the power for courts to adjudicate on his 'so difficult' and 'diminished' tests.  122
Gordon recommends a far less restrictive test: Parliament can enact any measure, he says, 
provided that is does not make it 'effectively impossible' to legislate.   He thinks that this 123
modest limit should be policed by politics rather than judges.  Underlying these two views 124
of parliamentary authority are two competing theories of democracy and separation of 
powers.  For Goldsworthy, democracy requires that the proposed measure 'enjoy[s] wide-
spread, non-partisan support... [and is]...consistent with democratic principle'.  This 125
understanding of democracy, and the role he assigns to courts, perhaps recalls Dworkin's 
 Goldsworthy (n 59) 174.121
 An example of where courts should disallow a procedure under these tests, he says, is a 122
requirement for a two thirds super-majority.   Such a provision 'should not be regarded as purely 
procedural' he argues, because '[i]n effect, they give a minority of members the power to veto 
legislation'. ibid 198.
 Sovereignty (n 1) 104.123
 ibid 302-322 and 105-107.124
 Goldsworthy (n 59) 140.125
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'constitutionalist' theory.    For Gordon, by contrast, majoritarian democracy and political 126
constitutionalism combine to give Parliament and politics untrammelled power. 
 Which of these moral theories gives the better interpretation of the practice?  127
Space does not permit a thorough comparison. One possible implication of Goldsworthy's 
procedure and form theory is that the referendum locks contained in the EU Act 2011 Act 
are legally impermissible.  Since these locks arguably diminish parliament's power to enact 
law, then, according to his Diceyan view of parliamentary sovereignty, the 2011 Act cannot 
be a valid act.  If so, then this must count against Goldworthy's position.    If a 128 129
constitutional theory cannot explain a provision widely held to be valid law within a legal 
system, then it is likely to be the theory rather than the provision that we need to question. 
On the other hand, support for Goldsworthy's account can perhaps be found in Jackson.  130
The very decision by the House of Lords to adjudicate on the validity of the Parliament Act 
1949 and the Hunting Act 2004 arguably chimes with Goldsworthy's views on the 
 Dworkin (n 34).126
  I am conscious that Goldsworthy, like Gordon, may well resist this interpretative recasting of 127
his theory, but my view is that this is the best way to understand each of their views.   See further, 
Stuart Lakin, 'Defending and Contesting the Sovereignty of Law: The Public Lawyer as 
Interpretivist' (2015) 78 MLR 549-570, 563-564.
 Sovereignty (n 1) ch 6.128
 Goldsworthy resists that conclusion by subtle adaptation of his theory. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 129
‘Parliamentary Sovereignty’s Premature Obituary’ UK Constitutional Law Blog (3 September 
2012), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/03/09/jeffrey-goldsworthy-parliamentary-sovereigntys-
premature-obituary/ (accessed 2 Jan 2018).
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democratic need for judicial review of procedures;  so too does the character of the court's 131
reasoning in terms of the democratic limits to the use of the 1949 Act.        132
 The last few paragraphs above give just a small peek into Gordon's intricate 
arguments about parliament's power to change its legislative power. Rather than attempt to 
comment any further on the details of his arguments, I want to make a broader point about 
the emphasis he places on manner and form considerations in Sovereignty. Whether or not 
he persuades us that parliament has successfully changed its legislative procedures in one or 
more of the ECA 1972, Parliament Acts and EU Act 2011, there is something odd, I think, 
about hanging an entire theory of the UK constitution on this power and this sprinkling of 
statutes.  In the first place, few (if any) theorists today deny that parliament possesses such a 
power, even if they disagree about its true nature and extent.  More troublingly, the effect 133
of Gordon's emphasis is to move a peripheral and occasional part of UK constitutional 
practice to the centre ground.     It implies that parliament's day-to-day legislative activity on 
manifold issues of substance is relatively uninteresting and uncontentious for a 
constitutional theorist. Gordon's final two chapters in Sovereignty - and substantial parts of 
his earlier chapters - are pretty much all about the manner and form power: its nature and 
justification, how parliament can be held politically to account for its use, and the way in 
which parliament could, in future, exercise it. If his book were entitled 'Constitutional 
Reform in the UK', this emphasis would make perfect sense. But the emphasis raises alarm 
bells in a book whose aim is to elucidate existing UK constitutional practice.      
 ibid [27].131
 See, for instance, the dictum of Lord Nicholls.  ibid [59].   See Goldsworthy (n 59) 176-178.132
 For instance, Young argues that, even within Dicey's conception of parliamentary sovereignty, it 133
is possible to entrench human rights.   See Young (n 69) chs 2 and 3.  Similarly, Goldsworthy claims 
to be able to accommodate the EU Act 2011 within this theory (n 129) above.
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 As an interpreter of the constitution, Gordon must use a much broader brush.   He 
must show that his majoritarian democratic-political constitutionalist theory of absolute 
power gives a compelling account of UK constitutional practice as a whole.   In particular, 
he must show that his theory can make sense of the role of law, judges and adjudication: 
how the phenomenon of statutory interpretation and common law reasoning impacts on the 
full range of parliament's legislative powers; and how it impacts on his ideals of political 
accountability. An interpretation that fails to account adequately, or at all, for these salient 
features of the practice will hardly be an interpretation at all.      
B.   Law and Adjudication 
A frustrating feature of Sovereignty is that Gordon fails to provide a positive, developed 
model of law and adjudication to accompany his highly developed model of political power 
and accountability.  Much of the time, we have to infer his views from his criticisms of 134
CLC and the rule of law, and his support for particular judgments and dicta.  Perhaps the 
most promising starting point is the theory of adjudication implicit in his political and 
positivist method.  The retail part of his ethical positivist part, recall, holds that citizens and 
judges should be able to identify clear rules without the need for contentious moral 
judgment.  This also means that judges will not be called upon to decide cases according to 
their own moral preferences. Gordon seems to have in mind here a strict 'formalist' account 
of law and adjudication where law must take the form of clear, ascertainable rules. The role 
 This is a common shortcoming in political constitutionalist literature.  See Paul Craig, ‘Political 134
Constitutionalism and the Judicial Role: A Response’ (2011) 9 IJCL112.
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he assigns to judges, it seems, is to apply those rules mechanically, without exercising 
judgement or discretion.    
 Further evidence for this formalist view is found in Gordon's sustained critique of 
CLC. The first of his major objections to CLC is its imprecision: it does not allow us to 'pin 
down a definitive list' of rights;  it prizes 'flexibility at the cost of uncertainty';  135 136
'[c]itizens cannot know their rights'.   These types of objections from legal certainty 137
reappear in Gordon's criticisms of the (substantive) rule of law.   The rule of law is 'too 
indeterminate to provide useful guidance'; it 'exacerbates the imprecision of the CLC';  it 
can lead to 'sudden change in law' with 'no advance notice or consultation'   We can glean 138
a little more about Gordon's view on law and adjudication from his second major objection 
to CLC, namely its undemocratic character.   Democracy, he says, is a 'crucial feature in 
determining the role of judges'.  CLC, he says, is 'fundamentally undemocratic',   'rights 139 140
focused' and individualistic.  Unfortunately, we do not clearly learn from Gordon what 141
form of adjudication would satisfy democracy, and how judges should avoid a focus on 
individual rights.  
 Does Gordon's theory of law and adjudication give a good understanding of UK 
constitutional practice? In my view, he pitches two equally implausible theories of law and 
 Sovereignty (n 1) 143.135
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adjudication against one other in his discussion of UK case law and statutes:  either judges 
apply the actual explicit conditions that have been put in place by Parliament, or they 
indulge in unrestrained moral and political argument with little or no regard for legal 
texts.  Take his account of Jackson.  On his extremely narrow reading of the case, the 142 143
law was clear, and so there was no genuine legal dispute.    It follows that, for him, the 144
(much-lauded) reasoning of the judges on principles of sovereignty, democracy, the rule of 
law, and so on, was nothing more than 'confused and contradictory rhetoric'.  Similarly, 145
the Pierson 'legality' principle involves a 'subversion of the literal meaning of [statutes]...' 
and provides no precise guide to as to what language Parliament would need to use to 
abrogate fundamental rights.  In effect, he says, judges use the principle in any way they 146
like.  Again and again, Gordon presents judicial decisions and doctrines in this polarised 147
way - often using excessively dismissive language.       148
 The problem with Gordon's formalist account of law and adjudication is precisely the 
one that I identified in the 'political' part of his methodology above.   He advances his 
formalist account as the factually correct one, and he insists that every other approach is 
 ibid, especially 201-217.142
 Jackson (n 52)143
 Sovereignty (n 1) 197.144
 ibid 203.  For a laudatory account, see Jeffrey Jowell, 'Parliamentary Sovereignty Under the 145
New Constitutional Hypothesis' [2006] PL 562.
 Sovereignty (n 1) 215.  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [1998] 146
AC 539.
 Gordon nonetheless seems to support the principle on the basis that Parliament retains the power 147
to legislate contrary to fundamental rights. Sovereignty (n 1) 217.
 E.g: '[The] judicial reiteration of [fundamental principles] may appear to be a rather banal 148
message...' ibid 236; 'the courts...somewhat haphazardly...' ibid 216 (my italics). 
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factually incorrect.  But here again he begs the question.  A characteristic feature of 
common law legal practice is 'hard' cases - cases in which the meaning of a statute or 
judgment is unclear.  In such cases - and perhaps in all cases - judges make different choices 
about how to interpret the legal texts.  They draw upon different principles and policies to 
justify one choice over others. There can be few better examples of the diverse judicial 
approaches to statutory interpretation than in Jackson itself.  Even supposing that it is ever 149
possible to identify an 'actual' parliamentary intention, that form of interpretation routinely 
competes with other forms. If Gordon is successfully to defend a majoritarian-political 
constitutionalist vision of the constitution, he must show how judicial disagreement fits 
within that vision.    He cannot simply wish it away, dismissing any reasoning at odds with 
his own formalist theory as 'mere rhetoric'.        150
 What about CLC? Gordon's account of this theory as 'merely normative ',  I am 151
afraid, is nothing more than a parody - much like his treatment of the interpretative method 
on which CLC scholars depend.  The 'constructive' form of interpretation employed by CLC 
scholars, correctly understood, is a careful attempt to understand the interaction between 
legal texts and moral rights and principles in hard cases.  Judges have a duty to interpret 152
statutes and common law judgments in light of the moral scheme underlying those 
provisions - and underlying legal practice as a whole. In this way, the law is neither brute 
 See Lakin (n 96).  See further Thomas Fairclough, 'Evans v Attorney General: The Underlying 149
Normativity of Constitutional Disagreement' in Satvinder Juss and Maurice Sunkin (eds), Landmark 
Cases in Public Law (Hart Publishing 2017).  
 Sovereignty (n 1) 122.150
 Sovereignty (n 1) 190.151
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fact nor ideal moral theory: it is, as Kyritsis puts it, 'justice in an institutional context.'  153
When understood properly, the CLC model of law and adjudication gives a highly 
persuasive account of UK constitutional practice. For instance, it closely captures judicial 
reasoning on the 'legality' principle;  and it makes good sense of the ECA 1972 and 154
Factortame debates.  Whatever his moral misgivings about law and judges, Gordon must 155
confront CLC on its merits rather than hurl insults at a straw-man version of the theory - no 
CLC scholar would recognise or endorse the version he attacks in Sovereignty.   It may 156
well be that he could develop a powerful political constitutionalist answer to the (actual) 
CLC account of judicial disagreement, adapting more sophisticated models of positivist 
adjudication in hard cases.   Sovereignty is something of a missed opportunity in this 157
respect. 
5.  Conclusion 
 Kyritsis (n 106) 110.153
 See the cases and judgments discussed by Gordon in Sovereignty (n 1) 207-217. 154
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There are many intriguing features of Sovereignty that I have not been able to discuss in this 
review. Readers will find much interest, for instance, in his analysis of the competing 
perspectives of Dicey and Jennings on law and politics,  and in the way that Gordon traces 158
the evolution of ideas in Jenning's work.  My focus has instead largely been a 159
methodological one.   I have tried to highlight some problems with the approach Gordon 
takes to constitutional analysis - his positivist and political perspective. This approach, I 
have argued, does not allow for a fair comparison between competing accounts of the 
constitution; it loads the dice in favour of Gordon's substantive theory. I have instead 
examined his majoritarian democratic-political constitutionalist theory of absolute unlimited 
legislative authority as a morally contentious interpretation of UK constitutional practice. 
When assessed in this way, I think his account falls short.   It has too much to say about the 
power of parliament to change its own legislative procedures; and it has too little to say 
about the role of law and adjudication within the constitution.    
 Sovereignty (n 1) 58-74.158
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